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Introduction 
 This article examines the role of Chinese revenue farmers in defining the 
borders of the various colonial territories and states of Southeast Asia during the 
nineteenth century. The role of these individuals has largely been neglected in the 
current writing on the formation of state boundaries. Nicholas Tarling, in his 
Southeast Asia: A Modern History, notes “Between the late eighteenth and the early 
twentieth almost all southeast Asia was divided into colonies or protectorates held by 
the Western powers, and new boundaries wer drawn with the object of avoiding 
conflict among them” (Tarling, 2001:44). His view is typical of most who have 
studied the period. 
 While his comment acknowledges the role of the Western powers in surveying 
the boundaries, drafting treaties and map-making, it really says nothing about how 
those divisions were actually policed and made real on the ground. This aspect of 
“border-making” was left to the independent Chinese monopolists who worked on 
behalf of the colonial regimes. This paper examines their role during the middle years 
of the nineteenth century and attempts to give an account of their significance in the 
organization of colonial governance and in giving substance to the formalistic 
pronouncements of remote diplomats and statesmen.   
 
Borders and Populations 
Southeast Asia presents a unique case historically because despite the fact that 
the major states have long-standing historical traditions, until the nineteenth century 
most lacked clearly defined borders. It can be considered to have been a region 
without borders or clearly defined frontiers between major political units.  
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This situation seems to have been the result of a number of environmental 
factors. On the one hand the region is almost uniformly tropical and thus was 
originally covered by dense tropical rainforest. This forest, to a great extent, remained 
uncut and uncleared until the second half of the twentieth century.  Likewise, the 
coasts and great river valleys of the region were covered by large tracts of swampy 
lowlands which required considerable inputs of manpower before being available for 
cultivation. Coastlines, in many areas were marked by vast expanses of mangrove 
swamp, and even inland, by swamp forest.  
These conditions and the warm, moist temperatures of the equatorial and sub-
equatorial areas militated against the settlement and growth of large concentrations of 
human beings. Even where it may have been possible to bring large numbers of 
people together at any one time, continued residence in one spot would ultimately 
create considerable sanitation problems which would lead to the proliferation of 
parasites and the outbreak of epidemics. As a result, population densities throughout 
the region tended to be historically low. 
Historically, throughout most of Southeast Asia, land by itself, has not been a 
scarce resource. The most valuable productive resource prior to the nineteenth century 
was manpower. Manpower was necessary to man armies; to build monuments; and to 
produce exportable commodities; and especially to produce more food to produce 
more manpower.  The natural accumulation of manpower, however, was a long, slow 
and irregular process. Anthony Reid estimates that the population of the region in 
1600 was just over 22 million. Vietnam, the largest, had only about 4.7 million, 
concentrated in the north and the center. Java (4 M), Burma (3.1 M), Sumatra, (2.4 M) 
and Siam (2.2) followed. None of these represented a single political unit. By 1800, 
the entire region had increased by a little under 50 percent (Reid, 1988:15), but 
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compared with Europe, China, India and even the Middle East, this was still an area 
marked by “demographic immaturity”. Reid comments: 
Its overall density of population of about 5.5 persons per square kilometer 
contrasted with densities for South Asia of about 32 and for China (excluding 
Tibet) of about 37 (after McEvedy and Jones 1978). Further away Europe had 
roughly double the Southeast Asian population density.  
Reid argues that the main reasons for the extraordinarily low populations were 
warfare and religion. (Reid, 1988:16) 
Even though there were areas of extremely fertile soils, such as the volcanic 
islands of Java and Bali, and many fertile alluvial areas, land clearance and intensive 
agriculture required inputs of labor, and this key factor of production was always in 
short supply. As a result, where powerful political units did develop, they often did so 
by means of “capturing” a population and subjugating it to labor in the service of the 
king.  
One area where populations tended grow was near the sea-coasts where 
smaller river valleys and coastal lowlands, such as those along the coasts of the Malay 
Peninsula and the Gulf of Siam. These were more manageable than the larger river 
deltas such as those of the Irrawaddy/Salween, the Chao Phraya and the Mekong. 
With such areas under rice cultivation, and the nearby sea and rivers as sources of 
protein, pockets of population could flourish. It was necessary, however, to be able to 
defend themselves from enemies that might arrive by sea.  
It is well-known that Southeast Asian waters were periodically dominated by 
“pirates” from the earliest recorded times. The phenomenon of piracy in this area 
needs to be understood in relation to the demographic situation. One of the main 
targets of sea-borne raiders was the people themselves. James Warren’s discussion of 
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the activities of the Illanun raiders during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries in the Philippines and around the coasts of Borneo and the Malay Peninsula 
shows the political and economic utility of such activity. Captives could be sold and 
they could also be brought back to the home base and employed in the business of 
producing export commodities to trade with Chinese and other foreign traders who 
visited the Sulu Sultanate. (Warren, 1981) 
It is probable that the first major Indianized state of the region, Funan, located 
near the mouths of the Mekong River managed to establish itself by means of such 
raids on nearby populations. Likewise the chronicles of Ayutthaya constantly refer to 
the practice of “sweeping up” populations by armies moving between the Siamese 
heartland and the Cambodian population centres around Angkor in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries. Later, during the nineteenth century, we see the same sort of 
activity along the eastern shore of the Gulf of Siam between the mouth of the Chao 
Phraya and the Bassac. Warfare in eastern and central Java in the sixteenth century 
reduced populations in that area, as did warfare in central Sumatra during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. (Reid, 1988:15)The goal of every political leader, 
or leadership group was to draw population, whether by transport, intimidation or by 
enticement.  
 Reid points out that lives were not necessarily lost in warfare, rather he points 
to the “instability created by constant low-level warfare.” (Reid, 1988:17) 
The larger states mobilized a substantial proportion of their male population 
into vast, ill-organized armies, without providing adequate supplies either for 
the soldiers or for their families left behind. Thousands of captives were 
marched back home by the victorious armies of Burma and Siam, or shipped 
home by Aceh and Makassar, with incalculable losses on the voyage. Perhaps 
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an even more important factor demographically was the need to be constantly 
ready for flight in troubled times. This probably meant avoiding births at least 
until the older children were able to run by themselves. (Reid, 1988:17) 
 The resulting demographic situation was that not only did overall population 
densities remain quite low, but that populations were generally concentrated in 
pockets of intensive wet-rice agriculture or else in maritime trading cities that, 
according to Reid were “surprisingly large in relation to the overall population” (Reid, 
1988:18). Such groupings provided safety in numbers, since large population 
concentrations were better able to defend themselves. As such, these groupings also 
served the ends of the rulers as well, since it placed their key resource within easy 
reach.  
 I argue here that one of the results of this demographic situation has been a 
particular style of political and geographical imagination that was characteristic of 
ruling groups in the region. Benedict Anderson’s pioneering article on the idea of 
power in Java speaks to the demographic and historical reality of most of Southeast 
Asia. (Anderson, 1990) Anderson argued that power was seen as something to be 
concentrated and accumulated around the person of the ruler. This is the way in which 
Southeast Asian rulers handled their subject populations. They brought them close to 
the capital and worked to prevent the growth of outlying accumulations which might 
challenge their own centrality.  
Mandalas and Maps 
This principle applied even to provincial towns, which were regularly cut 
down to size, often as staging areas for wars, or as outlying buffers which could be 
sacrificed to defend the capital. In fact, provincial towns, far from the center could 
just as easily either fall into enemy hands, or even worse, change sides and join forces 
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with an enemy. The Burmese invasions of Siam in the 1760 were certainly facilitated 
by the defection of these outlying centers such as Chiang Mai. This led to a policy of 
centralization which is explained in Pornpun Futrakul’s thesis on Siamese provincial 
towns before the twentieth century. (Futrakul, 1989)  
 As a result, borders, or frontiers between countries, such as those between 
Siam and Burma, or Siam and Cambodia, were generally nothing more than extensive 
tracts of wasteland or forest. They were largely uninhabited except for the few hunter-
gatherers who dwelt in the deep interior well away from marauding armies and slave-
catchers. In the Malay world, the key geographic limit of a “country” a negri was 
normally a river valley. To be technical, the border was the watershed, but in practice 
the border was an extensive area of ulu, or simply the “up-river” area which was 
empty of people.  
 The centripedal state structure that emerged from these conditions is expressed 
in the “mandala” theory of interstate relations, a concept elaborated both by Anderson 
and by O.W. Wolters. (Wolters, 1999) Anderson points out that the mandala 
presupposes that one’s immediate neighbour is one’s enemy, because power is not 
distributed equally in the kingdom, but is concentrated at the center and is weakest at 
the edges, on the border. This is just where as Anderson says, a ruler’s…  
…sphere of Power merges into the perimeter of his neighbour’s. Thus, if his 
control is not to be diminished and weakened by the pull of his neighbour’s 
Power, he must first exert his own Power against the neighbour. We may 
recall how the idea that the total quantity of Power in the universe is constant 
implies that any increase of Power in one place means an equivalent 
diminution elsewhere. Since Power is also fluid and unstable, always ready for 
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dispersal and diffusion, interstate aggression necessarily becomes a basic 
assumption about interstate relations.” (Anderson, 1990:44)  
A border, as we understand it today, was never a site of negotiation or regulation 
between congenial neighbors, rather it was a either a site of conflict or else a 
wasteland. 
 Along with this political principle, Wolters also argues that a ruler’s mandala 
was not necessarily territorial. Rather, the mandala could easily be somewhat 
interrupted. Political power did not need to be contiguous over a piece of territory. 
What mattered were networks of relationships and bonds of loyalty. This was 
particularly true of island Southeast Asia where the port-polities of the Malay world 
could maintain far-flung alliances with other quite distant political units. 
(Kathirithamby-Wells and Villiers, 1990) This model applied to states as diverse as 
eighth century Srivijaya, fifteenth century Melaka, seventeenth century Banten and 
nineteenth century Sulu. Even seventeenth and eighteenth century Ayutthaya seems to 
fit their model. 
 If we look at Stanley Tambiah’s mapping of pre-modern Siam’s “galactic 
polity” as it may have existed in the seventeenth century we get an idea of the manner 
in which Southeast Asian kingdoms were organized. (Tambiah, 1976:134-7) (Map 1) 
The state was really composed of the capital area and its immediate dependencies,  
smaller principalities and towns which were under the direct control of either the 
royal family or powerful groups within the court. Beyond them, both in distance and 
levels of central control were the first, second and third class provinces. The first and 
second class provinces were principalities which were nearly autonomous tributary 
kingdoms in their own right, some of which had their own dependencies, such as 
Phitsanulok, Nakorn Rachasima (Khorat) or Nakorn Srithammarat (Ligor).  Beyond 
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these were even more autonomous political units such as Cambodia, the Malay states 
of Patani, Kedah, Kelantan, etc. and Chiang Mai. These latter ones were only 
occasionally under the control of Ayutthaya and merely sent the gold and silver 
flowers as tokens of their subsidiary status. In times of war, they might be called upon 
to provide troops, but they could just as easily be won over by alien powers in the 
next circle such as Vietnam, Burma and Aceh or Johor.  
Map 1: Tambiah’s Galactic Polity of Ayutthaya ca.1700. 
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 Although based on a reading of Siamese chronicles discussed in terms of 
Siamese ideas of statecraft, Tambiah’s maps are his own creation and represent a 
construct which is informed by late 20th century concepts of geographical space. 
Thongchai Winichakul, on the other hand, has tried to explain what he sees as the 
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contemporary Siamese concepts of space. His study, Siam Mapped looks at a number 
of early “maps” of the kingdom. (Winichakul, 1994) The earliest ones appear to be 
more concerned with a cosmic vision (i.e. the Traiphum, or the Buddhist cosmology) 
rather than any kind of realistic representation of a portion of the earth’s surface. One 
of the early maps does, however, seem to offer some degree of representation, that is 
what he calls the Coastal map (Winichakul, 1994:Fig.4) which dates from the time of 
Taksin (1767-1782), but it appears to come from an earlier period since it is an 
Ayutthaya-centered map and does not show Bangkok or Thonburi. This is 
Thongchai’s description:  
There is another fascinating map in the Thonburi version of the Traiphum 
pictorial manuscript: a coastal map from Korea to Arabia which was 
incorporated into the description of the human world in the Traiphum 
scheme…In this map, all the coasts are lined up along the bottom part of the 
map and al the seas are in the upper part. It begins with Korea and Japan 
situated in the sea, followed by the Chinese coast opposite Taiwan rightward 
to Canton. The Vietnamese coast appears like a peninsula jutting into the sea 
with the mouth of the Mekhong River at its peak and the coast along the Gulf 
of Siam in a trough (panel 2). At the bottom of panel (3), Ayudhya appears as 
the biggest city in the gulf. (Winichakul, 1994:29) 
It is of interest too, that the map, even though a Siamese map, does not really 
show Siam as a kingdom or as any kind of a unitary entity, rather it simply shows 
Ayutthaya as a bigger and slightly more elaborate square than all of the other polities 
shown there. Also, while the various polities around the Gulf of Siam appear to be in 
the more-or-less the correct location, in terms of their north-south orientation along 
the shore, there is no scale of distance (although the distances between towns are 
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given in notations) nor is there any attempt to represent landforms as anything other 
than blobs. The Gulf is a large ‘trough’ with Ayutthaya at its base. The Malay 
Peninsula, to the west of Ayutthaya is simply a wide wedge of land similar to the 
Indochinese Peninsula to the east. The various principalities along the coast are 
represented by  
Source: (Klemp et al., 1989: Map 42) (Map 2) 
 
Map 2 
rectangles with the name written inside. Schematic indentations along the coastline 
show river mouths. 
 In other words, Southeast Asian kingdoms, or states, or polities, or whatever 
we want to call them, were not seen to exist, either substantively or figuratively as 
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contiguous blocks of territory surrounded by sharply defined borders. Rather they 
were towns surrounded by undefined territory. Borders, or frontiers, were broad zones 
of emptiness, and to some extent were systematically kept that way. What counted 
were the towns and areas where population was concentrated. On the maps, all we 
really see are the towns. 
 In a very real sense, this sort of geographical thinking was quite appropriate. 
The blank spaces in between the kingdoms were, to the contemporary peoples, simply 
spaces of undifferentiated forest and wasteland, inhabited only by forest savages or 
wild beasts. There would be no real reason to change their thinking about frontiers 
until such time as there were people to fill them up. There would, of course, be even 
more pressing reasons to demarcate clear borders when Europeans began to seize 
territories in the region and draw the borders themselves. This is perhaps the most 
well-recognized reason for the institution of borders in the region.  
 This line of causation is the one adopted by Thongchai. He sees the “mapping” 
of Siam as an enterprise that grew out of pressures on the Siamese state by both the 
British and the French. British activities on the Malay Peninsula and Burma led to the 
demarcation of a border between Siamese and British territories there. French interest 
in Cambodia called for a line in the east. As late as the 1880s, Siam still had no border 
and had not been mapped in such as way as to show the actual shape of the kingdom 
with a clear line drawn around it. Lines had only been drawn to mark out the borders 
of Siam with Kedah and Kelantan in the south; and another line between Battambang 
and Siem Reap cutting through the Great Lake. The north-eastern borders with 
Cambodia and the borders with Laos and Burma in the east, north and west did not 
yet exist.  
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I would like, however, to look beyond these well-documented colonial actions 
and to dwell on another, perhaps subsidiary factor that supported the border-making 
process in Southeast Asia. There is no doubt that European expansionism was one of 
the key factors driving the creation of maps and the demarcation of frontiers in the 
region. Another aspect of the frontier issue in Southeast Asia that needs attention is 
the role of the Chinese. I would argue that Chinese were important in a number of 
ways that have been largely overlooked. 
The first role played by Chinese was as pioneers. Their role has generally been 
ignored in the mainstream discourse of growth and economic development in the 
region. In my own work over the past few years, I have begun to develop an argument 
that would shift the focus, at least partially, to the activities of the Chinese. If we go 
back to the eighteenth century, to a time and place when European activities within 
Southeast Asia were rather limited, it is clear that a new era of Chinese settlement in 
the region was already underway. A glance at the map of the region as of about 1780 
shows that 20 or so settlements, a number of them exclusively Chinese, had been 
established in the region since the beginning of the century. This included places like 
Hatien, Trat, Chantabun, Songkla, Trengganu, Sambas, Pontianak, Riau, Phuket, 
Bangka.  These settlements can be seen as a part of what we have come to call the 
“water frontier”. (Cooke and Li, 2004) (Map 3) 
Map 3: Indian Ocean & South China Sea Showing Major Sites of Chinese 
Settlement in the 18th Century 
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Southeast Siam, particularly the towns of Bang Plasoi (now Chonburi), 
Rayong, Chantaburi and Trat – all ranged along the coast of the Gulf of Siam between 
the eastern coast of the Bight of Bangkok and the Cambodian border – were a key 
area of the water frontier. Together with Hatien, founded around the 1680s or 1690s, 
they seem to have been among the first settlements of Chinese labourers in Southeast 
Asia. By the mid-eighteenth century, we hear of tin mining settlements appearing at a 
number of places in the Malay Peninsula: Chumphon, Nakron Srithammarat and 
Songkhla in southern Siam; Kelantan and Trengganu in the Malay states on the east 
coast. On the west coast, there were Chinese tin miners in Perak and Phuket (Junk 
Ceylon). There were pepper and gambier planters on Bentan Island in the Riau 
Archipelago, gold miners in Pontianak, Sambas, Mempawa and other sites on the 
Kapuas River in western Borneo; pepper planters in Brunei; and tin miners in Bangka. 
All of these were established during the eighteenth century and all of them were 
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characteristically commercial establishments. In general they had little or nothing to 
do with European trade or colonialism and were purely a part of the expansion of the 
mainland Chinese economy at the height of the Qing boom during the reign of the 
Qianlong Emperor. 
There were earlier Chinese settlements in Southeast Asia, but these were 
almost exclusively in important European colonial capitals (e.g. Melaka, Batavia, 
Manila, etc.) or else in Southeast Asian state capitals such as Ayutthaya, Hue, Kedah, 
Palembang, Tanjong Pinang and other significant port-polities in the region.  Except 
for limited Chinese populations of craftsmen, mariners and some urban labourers, 
these were primarily merchant settlements. The new development in the eighteenth 
century was marked by the establishment of colonies of Chinese labourers. These 
settlements were “economic” in nature in that they were rooted in commercial 
production for export. They produced commodities which were saleable in China. The 
key commodities in question at the outset, in the eighteenth century, were pepper, 
sugar, gambier, tin and gold.  
How did these settlements spur the demarcation of borders? First of all, it is 
worth noting that the places chosen for settlement were in areas which were not 
heavily settled. Mineral deposits, in particular, are almost always found in sparsely 
populated hinterland areas, and in the mountains or foothills. Agricultural settlements, 
while often close to earlier Southeast Asian settlements, were not always near the 
largest ones. In many respects the new Chinese settlers were moving into those blank 
spaces on the map which had previously been uninhabited. Moreover, these new 
settlers were now making them economically significant regions, providing taxable 
commodities produced by taxable subjects. 
Chinese Settlers on the Siamese Border 
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One area that has drawn my interest is the Siam-Cambodian border region 
along the Gulf of Siam. In the towns of Chantaburi (formerly Chantabun) and Trat 
(formerly Tung Yai) we can see the process of border formation in action. Prior to the 
eighteenth century, Chantabun, the largest and oldest town in the area, was one of 
those border principalities that typically got overrun and reduced by marauding 
armies from both the east and the west. The earliest mentions of the town are in the 
Chronicles of Ayutthaya where it is claimed as one of the dependent kingdoms of 
Ayutthaya in 1351, during the reign of King Ramathibodi, the first king of Ayutthaya. 
(Cushman, 1996 p 10-11)1 
However, during his reign, the city was sacked by a Cambodian army and 
depopulated. The population was restored some years later by King Ramasuen (1388-
1395) who, after defeating Chiang Mai, deported its population to Chantabun and 
other cities on the Malay Peninsula. (Cushman, 1996, 12-3) The Chronicle mentions a 
second depopulation of Chantabun at the end of the sixteenth century during the reign 
of King Thammaracha (1569-1590). In fact, the Cambodians “swept up” the 
population of the entire coastline. 
At that time the King of Lawaek [Cambodia] repeatedly organized troops to 
scout about, both by land and by boat, and the inhabitants of Chanthaburi, the 
inhabitants of Rayong, the inhabitants of Chachoengsao and farmers were 
speedily lost to the Lawaek enemy in great numbers. (Cushman, 1996, p77) 
These are the only two mentions in the Chronicle of the systematic relocations of 
population that happened on the Thai-Cambodian border during the Ayutthaya period. 
No doubt there were more. There are other reports that tell of a major Thai invasion of 
                                                 
1 Other dependencies mentioned at the time included Melaka, Chawa (Java), Nakorn Srithammarat, 
Tenassarim, Martaban, Moulmein, Songkhla, Phitsanulok, Sukhothai, Phichai, Sawankalok, Phicit, 
Kamphaeng Phet and Nakhorn Sawan.  
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Cambodia in about 1720. While Chantaburi is not mentioned in the accounts, one 
might be safe in assuming the city’s male population was targeted for conscription 
into the military, if nothing else. The invasion was described as a failure, and so it is 
probable that not many of them came home. British country trader Alexander 
Hamilton visited Siam and other countries in the region around the beginning of the 
eighteenth century reported: 
In 1717 the King of Siam made war against Cambodia & sent an army of 
50,000 by land and 20,000 by sea and committed care of his Armies to his 
Barkalong [Prah Klang] a Chinese, altogether unacquainted with War. The 
China man accepted of the Charge with much Reluctancy, but the King would 
not be denied.  The War proved unsuccessful… (Hamilton, 1739:97) 
At the time, Hamilton remarked on the desolation of the Siamese-Cambodian 
coastline: “…for 50 Leagues and more along the Sea-shore, there are no Sea-ports, 
the Country being almost a Desert.” (Hamilton, 1739:104) 
 Fifty years later, however, conditions had undergone a major transformation. 
The towns of Chonburi (Bang Plasoi) Rayong, Chantaburi and Trat (Tung Yai) were 
all thriving settlements, populated by a highly variegated mix of peoples that included 
Siamese, Chinese, Vietnamese, Malays, Cambodians and other indigenous groups. 
Where had these people come from and what were they doing there? 
 It is clear that one important group which had settled there was a community 
of Chinese pepper planters. Indications are that these were mostly Teochew 
agriculturalists that probably had some links to the Teochew pirates who were said to 
roam the coasts of south-eastern Siam. Other reports also suggest that there was a 
similar settlement of pepper planters further east at Tung Yai. 
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 There was also a community of Cochinchinese Christians who had fled from 
persecutions in Dang Throng. They were under the leadership of the French 
missionaries of the Missions Étrangé de Paris (MEP) who had established missions in 
various parts of Vietnam, Siam, and Burma. They do not appear, however, to have 
been the first Vietnamese to arrive in Chantaburi. There were also many non-
Christian Vietnamese in the town.  
 The presence of Malays, Bugis, Orang Laut, Chams and other Southeast Asian 
sea farers would have been a common thing in the region for many centuries before. 
French and Dutch reports from the early eighteenth century indicate that a large 
proportion of the population of Ayutthaya were Malays. It seems clear that Malay sea-
farers were active throughout the Gulf of Siam prior to the nineteenth century. The 
Natuna and Anambas Islands were important rendezvous sites for the Orang Laut of 
the Johor-Singapore Straits and the Bugis. (Ali Haji ibn Ahmad, 1982)2 
 This portion of the water frontier was anchored by the port of Hatien, also 
known as Cancao, and Puntaimas. Founded by the Chinese sea-farer, and perhaps 
pirate, Mac Cuu in about 1690, the settlement had grown into a flourishing entrepot 
by the middle of the eighteenth century. Although the town was listed as a tributary 
by the courts of Vietnam, Cambodia and Siam, it was largely autonomous during the 
eighteenth century. It too had a mixed population of Siamese, Cambodians, Chinese, 
Vietnamese, Malays, etc. (Mantienne, 2003:45) 
It was sacked by the Siamese in the 1720s, but the port recovered and 
continued to be important in the newly emerging economy of the Gulf of Siam and 
the mouth of the Bassac. Records from Macau indicate that Hatien shipped 
considerable quantities of rice, timber, tin and pepper to China. Since none of these 
                                                 
2 The Tufhat al-Nafis begins with the voyage of the five Bugis brothers to Cambodia. While there, 
Daing Marewa’s wife was left at Tambelan where she gave birth to a son who was later named Daing 
Kemboja in honor of his father’s winning a cockfight in Cambodia. 
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goods were produced in Hatien, one assumes they must have been drawn there 
through a shipping network which linked it to the Gulf,  the Straits of Melaka and 
even Java. Mantienne notes that it had a prosperous trade and welcomed Chinese 
junks from Batavia, China, Melaka, Siam and Cochinchina. During the 1760s and 
1770s, while Siam, Cambodia and Vietnam were disrupted by civil war and invasion, 
Hatien was a place of refuge. It was here that the French priests of the MEP moved 
their base as did the Franciscans who had been active in Vietnam. The missionaries 
and their flocks were welcomed by Mac Thein Tu who had succeeded his father as the 
ruler of Hatien. (Mantienne, 2003:41-48) 
 Although the populations in towns such as Chantabun were mixed, one must 
assume that it was the Chinese who were largely responsible for the increase. The 
large numbers of laborers were producing new wealth and thus a spurt of economic 
activity that created a general wave of prosperity. In fact, Paul Van Dyke, working on 
the Canton trading system has actually been able to trace the money. He shows a 
pattern of European company merchants in Canton and Macau (British, Danish, 
German, etc.) advancing money or participating in joint ventures with the Hong and 
other Canton merchants. This cash not only helped work the tea trade, but also 
financed the Chinese merchants’ trade to the Nanyang, much of which was in search 
of commodities that were accessories to the tea trade (e.g. rattan, tin, lead, rice, etc). 
(Van Dyke, 2005) 
 As the Chinese filled up the blank spaces on the map, the regions drew the 
interest of nearby Southeast Asian rulers and colonial powers. Chantabun, by way of 
example, with a thriving population of Chinese planters and others became an 
important site in the 1760s. Particularly, in 1767, after the Burmese had sacked 
Ayutthaya, the region of southeast Siam along the eastern shore of the Gulf was one 
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of the few areas which had been spared the ravages of war. It was thus to Chantabun 
that Phrya Taksin retreated. He was a Sino-Thai trader and tax farmer who had helped 
to defend the capital. He fled to Chantabun in June of 1767 with a force of about 500 
men. He left there six months later with an army of 5,000 men and 100 ships (some of 
which he built and others he confiscated from Chinese traders/pirates in Trat). With 
this force, he returned to the Chao Phraya and defeated the Burmese at Bangkok and 
established his new capital across the river at Thonburi. 
 The Chinese of Chantabun and Trat were vital resources in restoring the 
kingdom. Not only did he recruit much of his new army from the region but, for much 
of Taksin’s reign, the Chinese merchants and mariners whom he had recruited there 
played key roles in building up his treasury and reconstructing the Siamese state. 
These were mostly Teochews and Taksin’s patronage gave them key positions in the 
Thai state even after he was deposed. (Aeusrivongse, 1986:135-8). Even though the 
most prominent Chinese during the Ayutthaya period were Hokkiens, the power of 
numbers and influence shifted to the Teochews from then on until the present time. 
 The earlier connection between the southeast coast and Hatien was, from the 
very beginning, a major issue for Taksin. As it turned out, a major competitor for the 
kingship of Siam was Mac Tien Tu, the ruler of Hatien. The latter was actually named 
as the ruler of Chantaburi in one Thai source. (Chaowatratanawong, 1997:111) This 
was probably an error, but it indicates the level of power in the region that Hatien had 
come to exercise by the end of the Ayutthaya period.  
 There was, however, a greater threat from Hatien. Mac Tien Tu had given 
refuge to two princes from the Ayutthaya court who, according to Chinese ideas of 
legitimacy, should have been the legal successors to the Siamese throne. Chen Ching 
Ho has written at length on the issue and has shown sources that tell us Mac Tien Tu 
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wrote to the Chinese court challenging Taksin’s right to succeed. Indeed, it was not 
until the very end of his reign that Taksin’s control of Siam was recognized by the 
Qing court. 
 In the immediate wake of Taksin’s conquest of the Burmese garrison at 
Bangkok, Mac launched an attack on Siam southeast coast and took both Chantabun 
and Trat. The following year, in 1769, Taksin retaliated, retaking Chantabun and Trat 
and then going on and sacking Hatien. These struggles between Taksin and Mac Tien 
Tu have been interpreted in a number of ways. Yumio Sakurai has seen it as a 
struggle between Teochews and Cantonese. (Sakurai, 2004) Chen Ching Ho has seen 
it as a struggle between two Chinese warlords (Chen, 1977) and Puangthong 
Rungsawadisab has called it a struggle for control of the Gulf of Siam and the Trans-
Mekong trade. (Rungswasdisab, 2004) Whatever the case, certainly an underlying 
factor in the continuing struggle in this area would be the real lack of a recognized 
border between the Siamese, Vietnamese, and Cambodian realms, together with the 
possibility that Chinese adventurers like Mac Cuu, his son, and Taksin could all hope 
to carve out a kingdom of their own in the region. 
 It would be more than another century before the border dispute in this region 
would be decided. Taksin and Mac Tien Tu fought again in the 1770s when Taksin 
captured Tien Tu and brought him back to Thonburi to die in prison. In the 1780s, the 
Tayson rebels moved into the region and further reduced the power of Hatien. The 
town was henceforth a part of the battleground between Gia Long in his extended 
struggle to defeat the Tayson brothers in the 1780s and 1790s. In the 1830s and new 
war erupted between Rama III and the Vietnamese Minh Mang Emperor which would 
lead to further devastation in the region. On the other hand, Bangkok strengthened its 
command of the south-eastern shore of the Gulf throughout the period from 1820 to 
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the 1860s. Crawfurd reports that taxation of Chantaburi’s pepper crop had increased 
significantly in the Bangkok period over what it had been prior to 1767. The real 
border, however, would not be finally drawn until the early twentieth century. 
Chantaburi and Trat were seized by the French in 1893 in their final imperial push in 
the region to expand the frontiers of Cambodia and Laos at Siamese expense. The 
territories were not returned to Siam until the treaty of 1907, which forced Siam to 
give up all of the eastern Cambodian provinces (Siem Reap, Sisiphon, Battambang 
and the western end of the Tonle Sap) which it had held since the 1840s. (Tuck, 
1995:Ch.9) 
Borders and Kangchus 
 Clearly the borders were finally hammered out as the result of political power 
plays by both French and the Siamese, but it was the presence of Chinese settlers who 
made this border a contested area in the first place. If we turn our attention to the 
Malay world, we see similar border drawing activities inspired by the Chinese 
presence. During the nineteenth century the state of Johor came to be populated by 
Chinese pepper and gambier planters moving there from Singapore. Here it is 
somewhat difficult to distangle Chinese systems of boundary drawing from those of 
the Malays.  
 The first Chinese settlements in the region had been made at Riau in the mid-
eighteenth century. While the evidence is not entirely clear, it appears that territories 
on Bintan Island were parcelled out to Chinese headmen known as kangchus (Lord of 
the port). About the time Raffles signed the treaty with Temenggong Abdul Rahman 
and took possession of Singapore, Chinese pepper planters were already establishing 
themselves there. By the 1840s, the cultivation was exhausting the available land in 
Singapore and began to move across the Strait to the Peninsula. I have argued in my 
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earlier work that this was simply the same system of cultivation moving from one 
place to another. (Trocki, 1979) 
In Johor each kangchu was given a small river valley and allowed to bring in 
laborers to develop the land within his watershed. He was also charged with managing 
the revenue farms, that is, the tax concessions. He was given the right to sell or 
provide smokeable opium (chandu), spirits, gambling, prostitution, betel nut, and even 
theatrical performances.  
 It seems natural that the Malay rulers would have divided their territories up 
according to river valleys and watersheds. The river was the established focus of the 
Malay negri, and under the Malay political system, these riverine states were divided 
by subsidiary tributaries, each one under a pengulu, literally, the headman of the ulu, 
or upriver area. The unique thing about the kangchu system was that all of the 
nomenclature was Chinese, rather than Malay. The Chinese headman was a kangchu, 
and his place of residence was the chukang and the place was usually named with the 
surname of the headman. Thus the kangchu’s settlement on the Tebrau River in Johor 
was Tan Chukang, named after Tan Kye Soon, who founded it. The names of the old 
pepper and gambier settlements on Singapore Island are still in use: Lim Chukang, 
Yio Chukang, Chua Chukang, etc. 
 This use of Chinese names suggests that the system actually owed more to the 
Chinese settlers than to the Malay rulers. In Singapore, it seems that the system was 
entirely of Chinese creation and management, since the Malays were not in 
possession of the island when the Chinese planters occupied those portions of it. It is 
difficult to say how much the system may have owned to Malay/Bugis management 
when it began in Riau. By the time the Chinese reached Johor, (in the 1840s) the 
system seems to have become fixed and under the Malay ruler was more formally 
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systematized with the issuance of written documents to the kangchus and overall 
management of the system by Malay bureaucrats. (Trocki, 1979) 
 There are two issues that concern us here. One is that the system of land 
division and border marking seems to have owed something, if not everything to 
Chinese initiative. Beyond that, it owed a great deal to Chinese management. The 
second thing is that in addition to being a division of territory for settlement and 
exploitation, it was also a division of territory for the taxation regime: the revenue 
farms. In fact, the question of control of the revenue seems to have been one, if not 
the key matter of concern in the issuance of the surat sungai, or “river document” 
which the Sultan issued to the kangchu. The fact that the kangchu controlled the 
revenue concession on his river was mentioned in every single surat sungai in the 
collection of these documents in the Johor Archives. If we look at the map of the 
kangchu settlements as of the mid-1860s, we get some idea of the areas under 
settlement and the regions controlled by Chinese tax farmers. (Trocki, 1979) (Map 4) 
Map 4  Johor Kangchus as of 1860 
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 In another example from Johor, a few decades we find a Malay explication of 
how land was divided. In this case, after a number of disputes among Chinese tin 
miners in the territory of Bukit Mor, the Sultan had sent his brother, Ungku Abdul 
Rahman along with the Dato Bentara Dalam, Ibrahim bin Munshi Abdullah. In his 
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memoir, Ibrahim explained the principle of territorial division according to 
watersheds. 
What I have described as rivers are not like most rivers, big and deep and 
flowing into the sea, but are merely creeks or rivulets.  Every stream 
invariably flows to low ground or a swamp (kuala), and always runs between 
two hills, and rises on a hill.  Whenever a stream flows down from a hill, 
passes between hills and reaches a swamp, it ceases to flow and empties itself 
there.  This point is called its mouth, and outlets of this sort always have hills 
to the left and right of them.  It has been decided that the limits of a river-
mouth are where the hills on either side come to an end.  It has also been 
decided where the boundaries of the rivers are, and that each river shall be 
owned by one towkay.  Each river shall extend from the farthest point 
upstream to the mouth, excluding the hill in which it rises.  The width shall be 
300 feet from the river-bank to the left and right, and no more.  If there is 
another river or stream nearby, then the boundary must be half-way between 
the two.  The boundaries of a swamp must not go beyond the foot of the hills 
on either side of it nor must its length exceed 1,800 feet square. (Ibrahim, 
1975:23) 
 For nineteenth century Malays, hilltops and watersheds were the keys of land 
division.  On the whole, these were not lines on a map, but tended to be rather remote 
and thinly populated zones, where travel was slow and difficult and the rule of the raja 
was rarely exercised with much effect.  However, when it was clear that those using 
the land would be occupying the entire territory, these principles could be refined to 
actual lines on a map as they were later in Borneo. 
Singapore’s Opium Farmers 
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 If we look at the revenue farming systems that operated in Singapore, we see 
the much larger superstructure of which the Johor chukangs were merely a 
component. The opium and spirit farms for Singapore Island, during the nineteenth 
century were the largest and most lucrative tax regimes in British Malaya. They were 
managed by the wealthiest and most powerful Chinese businessmen in the colony 
and, in Singapore, regularly constituted between 40% and 60% of the entire revenue. 
The entire colonial enterprise in Southeast Asia was financed by revenue farms. Every 
colony, every state farmed out the bulk of its revenues to Chinese tax farmers. 
 We cannot understand the nature of European colonialism in Southeast Asia 
without acknowledging the role of opium. In virtually every colony the revenue 
collected from the sale of chandu, or smokeable opium was one of the mainstays of 
the colonial revenue. While Singapore was perhaps an extreme case, this was only 
because of its commitment to free trade and to its lack of taxable exports. Other 
colonies drew revenues from taxing the export of tin, pepper, rubber, rice, etc. or from 
head taxes on Chinese or other Asian immigrants. Even in them however, opium 
revenues rarely constituted less than 30% of the gross state income. (Trocki, 1999) 
 For the purpose of this study the important issue is that the tax farms were 
territorially based. That is, each tax concession was issued after competitive bidding, 
to a specific individual (usually to his company or syndicate) for a limited period of 
time (usually 3 years) over a specific piece of territory. This left to the Chinese 
businessman who collected the revenue, the task of maintaining the boundary of that 
territory and of preventing the smuggling of opium, or spirits, or whatever commodity 
was being controlled across that boundary. Europeans may have drawn and surveyed 
the borders, but it was the Chinese businessmen who policed them and gave them 
reality on the ground.  
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 If we look at the Dutch and French settlements in the region the story is very 
much the same. It may be that the Chinese who ended up controlling the opium farms 
of French Indochina controlled some of the same territories before the French arrived. 
Whether they did or not is immaterial, the fact is that as soon as the French began to 
define their boundaries, they began to employ Chinese farmers to patrol them and 
give them substantial meaning. 
 If we return to the territories of the old Water Frontier during the 1860s, we 
find that after a disastrous attempt to allow the farms of Cochinchina to be managed 
by Europeans, the French had given the revenue farming contract to a syndicate of 
Cantonese led by a merchant known as Wangtai (his tradename), but his syndicate 
only held it for the year of 1864. The following year it was taken over by a group of 
Singapore Chinese led by one Banhap. (also a tradename) He and his partners, the 
three Tan brothers, (Tan Keng Ho, Tan Keng Hoon and Tan Keng Seng) held the 
Cochinchinese farms for nearly two decades, from 1865 to 1882. (Dumarest, 1938:44-
45)It was these Chinese businessmen and their employees who policed the new 
boundaries of Cochinchina and divided it from Cambodia on the west and from 
“Annam” on the north and east. French sources report that the rivalry between the 
transplanted Singapore Hokkiens and the Cantonese shifted off and on into the 1870s. 
Sometimes the Cantonese came into a partnership with Banhap, other times, they 
were rivals. In 1871, another Cantonese, Watseng, was able to take control of the 
Cambodian farms. Apparently, both syndicates launched smuggling operations 
against each other and, to a certain extent, patrolled the newly-drawn border between 
French Cochinchina and the protectorate of Cambodia. A French official in Cambodia 
wrote warning of the threat of armed clashes between the forces of the two farmers. 
(Moura, 1871) 
 30
 The key point of interest here is that the major smugglers were usually other 
opium farmers, very often the rival competitors for the same farm. The best means of 
retaliating after being defeated in the bidding for a particular farm was to obtain the 
concession for a neighboring farm. Even if the neighboring territory was not really a 
very lucrative opportunity as such, it offered the possibility for the losing syndicate to 
both stay in business and to get revenge on their rivals.  
 This was a common strategy and it provided the occasion for opium farmers to 
both define and violate the newly-created colonial borders. In Singapore, it was 
always necessary for opium farmers to go to pains to obtain the similar farms for the 
Dutch islands of Riau, and those of the Malay state of Johor. In Penang, the farmer 
had to be sure to obtain the farms for Kedah. In Hong Kong, the strategic offshore 
territory was Macau. Beyond that Hong Kong itself was a prime smuggling location 
for the China market. Almost every major colonial city had an adjacent “suburb” of 
sorts which lay in another jurisdiction and thus lent itself to smuggling. It was in these 
areas that the Chinese businessmen who managed the revenue farms showed their 
mettle by both defining and violating the border. 
 This phenomenon of cutthroat competition between revenue farmers was a 
paradoxical thing. While it was often seen as a “problem” by colonial governments, it 
was actually an integral part of the system. In order to obtain the highest possible 
price for the farm, the government relied on a process of competitive bidding. But, 
that always left a loser. Moreover, it left a loser who, if he was a serious competitor 
already possessed wealth, power, influence and the necessary infrastructure to run the 
farms. That infrastructure was expensive to maintain, and so smuggling was not just 
an opportunity for revenge. It was a necessity for survival.  
 31
 James Rush has told the story of the revenue farms of Java and he too has 
called attention to the propensity of rival farming syndicates to smuggle against one 
another there. (Rush, 1990) In my earlier work I have shown that these smuggling 
contests could be the cause of considerable social unrest. Normally, the various 
revenue farmers had alliances with one or another secret society, and once they were 
armed the propensity for serious violence was very high. In Singapore, individual 
such as Tan Seng Poh and Cheang Hong Lim had shown they could provoke 
significant disruptions in their struggles through the 1860s. (Trocki, 1990) Similar 
violence periodically erupted in French Cochinchina, in Penang, southern Siam and in 
Java.  
 If these conflicts were seen as a problem for the colonial governments, there 
was one thing that was worse. That was collaboration. In Singapore, Penang, 
Cochinchina and even Hong Kong, the syndicates ultimately came to terms with one 
another. They decided to create joint farms, amalgamate the adjoining territories 
(despite political boundaries), and split the profits. This led to the situation of the 
same syndicates policing both sides of the various borders. While this created social 
peace it also meant that the farmers could present the government with an offer which 
it could not easily refuse: an offer which was usually far below the real value of the 
farms.  
 The loss of revenues led to further internationalization of the revenue farms. 
The first steps had already been taken by the farmers in amalgamating adjacent 
territories under the same farming syndicate. The farming syndicates were thus not 
just states within states, but states that transcended states. In 1879, the governor of 
Hong Kong John Pope Hennessey (a man who had formerly served in the Straits), 
invited the Singapore revenue farmers to bid for the Hong Kong farms. He was 
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dissatisfied with the low bids being offered by the local Cantonese joint farm and 
decided to force their hand. The result was something far more sweeping than he had 
expected.  
 One of the Singapore farmers formed a combine with the above-mentioned  
Straits-born farmers of French Indochina and took over the Hong Kong farms. In 
1879, Banhap, joined together with his Saigon partner, Tan Keng Seng3, and the 
Singapore opium farmer, Cheang Hong Lim, and a few other Hong Kong Cantonese. 
Apparently the aim here was to create a truly global opium monopoly. By this time, 
small groups of Straits-born Chinese had come to control both the Singapore and 
Saigon opium farms. It appears that they also dominated the traffic in coolies from 
Fujian and the Chaochou region of Guangdong to Singapore and much of western 
Southeast Asia. The two rival opium groups in Hong Kong also controlled the traffic 
in Cantonese coolies to the United States, Australia and other parts of the Pacific Rim.  
Together with the coolie traffic they also controlled the flow of prepared opium to 
those settlements. Had Banhap and his partners succeeding in keeping their company 
and their concessions together, they would have been in a position to dominate the 
entire world market in opium and Chinese coolies.  
 Although it seems ironic, the Straits-born Chinese of Singapore had moved 
beyond the mere business of maintaining colonial borders and were attempting to 
create networks and alliances that not only spanned those borders, but also violated 
them. It was an attempt to create an empire within an empire. Like many over-
ambitious enterprises the vast Banhap syndicate collapsed almost as soon as it was 
                                                 
3 The Hong Kong sources report that Tan Keng Seng was the Singapore opium farmer, (Trocki, 2004) 
but there are no Singapore records to confirm this. At the time, Cheang Hong Lim, Tan Seng Poh and 
Tan Hiok Nee were listed as the Singapore farmers (Trocki, C. A. (1993) In The Rise and Fall of 
Revenue Farming:  Business Elites and the Emergence of the Modern State in Southeast Asia(Ed, Dick, 
J. B. H.) St. Martin's Press, New York & London, pp. 166-181., and Tan Keng Seng was located in 
Saigon with his two brothers. 
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born. It was attacked from virtually every angle. The ousted Hong Kong company 
adopted the usual strategy of securing the Macau farm and began to smuggle into the 
markets which Banhap had hoped to dominate. (Consul de France, 1879) Moreover, 
their business to the California and Australian coolies was in prepared opium 
(chandu) rather than raw opium and opium farming. What commanded the market 
was brand recongnition. In this case, the rival Cantonese syndicate still owned the 
brand names that were favored in those markets. They also attacked the combine from 
the inside by having some members join and then file lawsuits when financial 
difficulties arose. 
 Europeans also moved to destroy the business of this combine, although it is 
probable they had other aims in mind. Opium shipments and the coolie trade to 
California and Australia were both discouraged by restrictions on Chinese 
immigration newly enacted in those countries – another aspect of border maintenance. 
In Saigon, the French finally decided to take the farms away from Banhap and create 
a state-run monopoly, and in Singapore, Cheang Hong Lim’s company lost the farms 
to an outsider from Penang. So, by 1881, the entire venture had collapsed. 
  It was inevitable, perhaps that the colonial governments would tire of these 
games, and from the 1880s onward, as they gained resources and as attitudes against 
revenue farming hardened, governments created their own monopolies. In 1882, the 
French were the first. They took the farms from Banhap and company and created the 
first régie. (Descours-Gatin, 1992) In the 1890s, after a series of smuggling squabbles 
and excessive bidding by potential farmers, the Dutch in Java followed the French and 
created a monopoly. (Rush, 1990) Finally, in 1910, after a spectacular financial 
debacle in which the Singapore farms collapsed and the farmer went bankrupt, the 
British too, decided to take the opium business into their own hands. (Trocki, 1990) 
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 The creation of government monopolies marked the end of an era in Southeast 
Asia. Throughout the nineteenth century, opium farms and opium farmers had been 
the key instruments of border maintenance for the colonial states. With the system of 
monopolies, the colonial governments not only undertook the business of 
manufacturing and retailing prepared opium to their populations, they also undertook 
the police functions of protecting their monopolies, which included the whole 
business of border maintenance. It is no accident that Eric Tagliacozzo focuses his 
study of smuggling and smuggling prevention on the period between 1870 and 1910, 
for these are the years in which we see the internationalization of opium farms and the 
first moves by colonial powers to take direct control of their borders. 
Conclusion 
 This has been a wandering excursion on the ins and outs of Southeast Asian 
mapping and border-making, along with a discussion of Chinese settlement and 
opium farming. The aim here is to bring together all these disparate threads  
The overall point is that Chinese migration and business development have 
been an important part of the “bordering” of Southeast Asia. It might be possible to 
argue that in the beginning, even though there were states, there were no borders. This 
was largely because there was an insufficient population. While indigenous Southeast 
Asian populations were probably beginning to increase by the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, it is clear that major increases came from Chinese migration. It is 
also important to note that a significant portion of this Chinese migration was exactly 
to those border areas which had previously been empty. This process of migration to 
Southeast Asia continued throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century, 
not slowing until the 1930s. 
 35
From the 1830s, Southeast Asia entered a period when the newly established 
colonial governments come to rely largely on Chinese opium farmers to aid them in 
the management of their new states. The middle years of the nineteenth century up to 
the 1880s, is generally recognized as a period of laissez-faire colonial rule in the 
region. Even in directly ruled territories such as the Straits Settlements, Hong Kong 
and Cochinchina, much power and many functions of government were delegated to 
private actors. To the revenue farmers fell much of the task of border maintenance 
and tax collection. In fact, it was during these years that most of the borders were 
actually defined, if not precisely surveyed and mapped. 
The years after 1880 saw the progressive rationalization of the colonial states 
throughout the region. Colonial bureaucracies were professionalized and the functions 
of government, particularly tax collection, policing and border control were gradually 
taken fully into the hands of the state. Professional surveyors, on both sides of the 
notional borders precisely defined the lines. Police forces and coast guards were 
deployed to man the borders and to regulate the movement of goods and people across 
the newly established frontiers. By 1910-1915, much of this process was complete 
and the need for Chinese business people to carry out the functions of the colonial 
state was no longer as necessary as it had once seemed.  
 Finally, it is necessary to draw attention to the fact that these new borders 
have, for the most part defined the current nation-states of Southeast Asia. Within the 
“histories” of these nations, the role of the Chinese and of the revenue farmers is 
generally ignored. National history should be made by national actors, and the 
Chinese do not generally qualify for that role. 
 
******************************************************************** 
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